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Piotr Dziedzic
The Word, the Self, and the Underground 
Estate of Pierce Inverarity in Thomas 
Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49
Not least among the possible forms of dychotomization to which Pynchon’s 
fiction lends itself is the division into the “overground” realm of the visible 
and various forms of the underground. Thus in V., Benny Profane, tired of the 
street, the spurious alternative to the hot-house of paranoid speculation and 
a metaphysical cul-de-sac, is offered a chance to try his luck under the arid 
thoroughfares of the West: he literally climbs down under the streets of New 
York, and his peregrinations in the sewers of this city are not free of antic­
ipatory desire for some sort of soteriological revelation. On a less literal level, 
Malta, with its supposedly rich deposits of myth and ancient wisdom, stands 
in opposition to the superficiality of a civilization where people tend to oscil­
late between self-induced mindlessness and self-created façades. Godolphin 
makes his terrible discovery under the gaudy skin of reality, and Stencil’s quest 
centers upon a conspiracy whose alleged aim is to undermine the metaphys­
ical foundations of the West. In all cases, whether they are imagined or real, 
and whether their message appears to be hope-inspiring or frightening, Pyn­
chon’s murky underworlds lure with the promise of transcendence, of going 
beyond the predictable mendacities of daylight.
In Pychon’s second novel, The Crying of Lot 49, the possible existence of 
a mysterious underground is also pitted against the outward appearance of 
things, and again the reader’s picture of events is mediated through the mind 
of a protagonist. The mind at the centre of the story (the mediation in this case 
is complete, and the reader is not allowed even such ambiguous ventures outside 
the subjectivity of a particular consciousness as in the case of V.) is that of
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a young Californian, Oedipa Maas. One day she learns to her surprise of hav­
ing been named the executrix of the estate left by her dead lover, the billion­
aire Pierce Inverarity. The news arrives in the form of a letter from a law firm 
in Los Angeles and, as the narrative begins, Oedipa can be seen standing in 
the living room alone, “stared at by the greenish dead eye of the TV tube” (Lot 
49, l),1 trying to come to terms with such unwelcome surprise. The TV set 
which communicates nothing, the letter which communicates something, its 
addressee, helpless, alone, and trying to feel more drunk than she really is - 
all of these suggest that the novel may have something to do with the prob­
lems of communication and information, perception and loneliness. And in­
deed, what immediately follows bears this assumption out. The image of Oedipa 
deliberately attuned to the sounds of Muzak - music to do things by and forget; 
her recollection of the last telephone conversation with Inverarity when, phon­
ing her from some distant place at three in the morning, he tried to commu­
nicate something but failed; the way in which she and Mucho, her disc-jockey 
husband trafficking in worthless babble of pop, “throw” at each other bits of 
information concerning their most recent respective disasters; the pathetic 
inadequacy of Oedipa’s attempt to console her oversensitive spouse (“Yeah, 
there was so much else she ought to be saying also, but this was what came 
out” (3)): the interwoven thp Aes of communication and isolation quickly 
establish themselves as a dominant motif in the story, finding, at the end of 
the first chapter, a symbolic expression in two poignant images of solitude and 
confinement. These two images come from Oedipa’s most private iconogra­
phy. The first of them, a likening of her own making, shows Oedipa in “the 
curious, Rapunzel-like role of a pensive girl somehow, magically, prisoner 
among the pines and salt fogs of Kinneret, looking for somebody to say hey, 
let down your hair” (10). This image of a girl anxiously waiting for a Knight 
of deliverance conflates in her mind with another, a painting by the Spanish 
artist Remedios Varro, showing
[...] a number of frail girls with heart-shaped faces, huge eyes, spun-gold hair, 
prisoners in the top room of a circular tower, embroidering a kind of tapes­
try which spilled out of the slit windows and into the void, seeking hope­
lessly to fill the void: for all the other buildings and creatures, all the waves, 
ships and forests of the earth were contained in this tapestry, and the tap­
estry was the world. (10)
The second image is especially important, as it shows human isolation to 
be the consequence of the inability to face the world directly, viz., without the 
dubious mediation of the self. In the picture by Varro, the world is almost 1
1 All page numbers in parentheses refer to Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1967).
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entirely a product of man who, faced with unfathomable vastness, keeps im­
posing on it patterns of the mind’s invention. In effect, instead of being con­
fronted with unmitigated truth, man deals with the elaborately embroidered 
tapestry produced by his consciousness: we are back in Baedekerland of 
Pynchon’s first novel. In Oedipa’s case, however, the irony directed against 
“tourism” as a mode of evasion is missing, and the stress is laid upon the tragic 
inevitability of distortion in all cognitive acts, as they can lead to an acute feeling 
of separateness from other beings - human or otherwise. Unable to leave the 
lonely tower of her mind, Oedipa is nagged by “the sense of buffering, insu­
lation, [noticing] the absence of an intensity, as if watching a movie, just 
perceptibly out of focus, that the projectionist refused to fix” (10). Not that 
she never tried to escape; her affair with Inverarity was nothing if not an 
endeavour to put an end to her isolation. However, “all that had gone on between 
them had really never escaped the confinement of that tower” (10), and on a trip 
to Mexico (where they happen upon the Varro exhibition) Oedipa is unexpect­
edly reminded that people can travel to the end of the world and yet remain 
prisoners of their selves. Standing in front of the picture, she breaks into tears.
And yet, dismayed at the prospect of life-long confinement, Oedipa nev­
ertheless toys with the idea of preserving that particular distortion of vision 
which has come about in consequence of her tears coming in contact with the 
lenses of her sunglasses:
Oedipa, perverse, had stood in front of the painting and cried. No one had 
noticed; she wore dark green bubble shades. For a moment she’d wondered 
if the seal around her sockets were tight enough to allow the tears simply 
to go on and fill up the entire lens space and never dry. She would carry 
the sadness of the moment with her that way forever, see the world refracted 
through those tears, those specific tears, as if indices as yet unfound varied 
in important ways from cry to cry. (10)
One can detect that same ambivalence on the part of Oedipa with regard to 
the ideal of unmediated perception. The prospect of willfully and permanently 
settling in a particular “mindscape” is tempting indeed - particularly for some­
one groping for the elusive truth in the darkness of an underground.
This temptation keeps growing as Oedipa’s amateurish attempts to execute 
Inverarity’s will develop into a Pynchonian quest, the letter initiating a series 
of apparent encounters with a secret system whose essential concern seems to 
be the same as hers: communication. The coincidence is striking, and it soon 
occurs to Oedipa that the Tristero, the mysterious postal organization at the 
centre of her quest, might be the result of Inverarity’s elaborate plan, an in­
trigue set up in order “to bring to an end her encapsulation in her tower” (28). 
If so, the task must have been enormous. As Oedipa gathers more and more 
information about the organization, the proofs of its shadowy existence appear 
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to crop up everywhere, stretching back to the 16th century, when Tristero, its 
alleged founder, began violently challenging the Thurn and Taxis postal 
monopoly in Europe. By the middle of the 19th century the Tristero seems to 
have already infiltrated into America; once there, it continued in its alternative 
function, a rival of the Pony Express, determined to spread subversion in the 
“overground” channels of communication. In the 1960s (when the action of 
Lot 49 takes place) it appears to be still very active, signalling its presence to 
those in the know through the sign of the muted post-horn and two acronyms: 
death and waste. As night (blackness) constitutes its ambience and death part 
of its image, the Tristero seems to be standing for something silently sinister. 
However, it is also an anti-establishment force, inimical to everything official 
and superficial, a system belonging to and serving the needs of those who have 
withdrawn from the American society.
The ambiguous nature of the Tristero (perhaps a message in its own right, 
a sign to be deciphered) adds to the central ambiguity of the story, that which 
concerns the dubious epistemological status of Oedipa’s discovery. Not only 
is she uncertain about the true meaning of the Tristero, but, right through the 
end of the novel, she remains confused in regard to the question of its very 
existence. But whether it is in fact a real organization, a performance staged 
by Inverarity, or only a hallucination, Oedipa’s experience is not a trap in the 
sense Stencil’s V. manifestly is.
In this respect, Oedipa differs not only from Stencil, but also from some 
other characters she meets or hears about, notably the members of the Peter 
Penquid society and the Scurvhamites: allegedly an extreme right wing organ­
ization, and a radical puritan sect adhering to a Manichean worldview. In ei­
ther group, the idea of an adversary “fixes” the minds or believers. It is par­
ticularly true of the sectarians in question. Is the Scurvhamites’ belief “in the 
brute Other, that kept the non-Scurvhamite universe running like clockwork 
(117) (the Other, it should be added, identified by them with the Tristero) to 
be construed as an instance of bad faith? Can the true purpose motivating this 
“Godly and purposeful society” (116) be seen as identical with their determi­
nation to put an end to the continuous process of becoming and assume a stable 
identity - first by defining themselves in simple contradistinction to their arch­
enemy and then, fascinated with “a brute automatism that lead to eternal death” 
(116), by defecting to the Other side? It would seem so inasmuch as what the 
Scurvhamites are really interested in is this “brute automatism,” the state of 
forgetfulness of man’s true ontological status. The defections point to their desire 
to belong and obey; it is the splendid unequivocalness of “being for” or “being 
against” that matters - morality has nothing to do with it.
The way in which Oedipa herself, in an unguarded moment, flirts with the 
idea of succumbing to the Tristero’s attractive power betokens the strength of 
the temptation. For her, confronted with so many indications of its existence, 
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this jump into faith would be tantamount to a jump into death. Not the real death, 
certainly, but the rigor mortis of the in-itself.
She was meant to remember. She faced that possibility as she might the toy 
street from a high balcony, roller-coster ride, feeding time among the beasts 
in the zoo - any death wish that can be consummated by some minimum 
gesture. She touched the edge of its voluptuous field, knowing it would be 
lovely beyond dreams simply to submit to it [...]. She tested it, shivering: 
I am meant to remember. (87)
However, as there is always something to make her wonder when she appears 
ready to do so, Oedipa never jumps. She never dwindles into a mere “she who 
looks for the Tristero” and, staying open to various interpretations of the 
revelations which come her way, intrigued and confused, hopeful and despair­
ing, never stops trying to get behind the screen separating her from the “cen­
tral truth itself’ (69).
In her quest, Oedipa is acutely sensitive to the presence of the ocean - 
a mysterious force always felt behind the pathetic actions of Californians. In 
its hugeness and power, the Pacific dwarfs the “irrelevance” of the life on the 
coast, and the two realms seem to be completely apart. And yet Oedipa can 
“feel” the ocean before it can be seen, heard, or smelt:
Somewhere beyond the battening, urged sweep or three-bedroom houses 
rushing by their thousands across all the dark beige hills, somehow implicit 
in an arrogance or bite to the smog the more inland somnolence of San 
Narciso did lack, lurked the sea, the unimaginable Pacific, the one to which 
all surfers, beach pads, sewage disposal schemes, tourist incursions, sunned 
homosexuality, chartered fishing are irrelevant, the hole left by the moon’s 
tearing-free and monument to her exile; you could not hear or even smell 
this but it was there, something tidal began to reach feelers in past ears and 
eardrums, perhaps to arouse fraction of brain current your most gossamer 
microelectrode is yet too gross for finding. (36-37)
The Pacific seems to be sending out signals which can still be received by means 
of some primeval faculty capable of rousing sensations “banned” by the “of­
ficial” senses and, unexpectedly, Oedipa restores a bind which seems to have 
been lost forever. The sensation, however, is short-lived and immediately 
followed by a feeling of uncertainty as to its true character:
Oedipa had believed, long before leaving Kinneret, in some principle of the 
sea as redemption for Southern California, [...] some unvoiced idea that no 
matter what you did to its edges the true Pacific stayed inviolate and 
intergrated or assumed the ugliness at any edge into some more general truth. 
Perhaps it was only that notion, its arid hope, she sensed as this forenoon 
they made their seaward thrust, which would stop short of any sea. (37)
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Not only does Oedipa remain awestruck in the presence of “that vast sink 
of the primal blood the Pacific” (122); to her, all intimations of transcendence, 
of going beyond the façade of boredom and predictability, are possessed of 
a distinctively religious flavour, so that on her quest she feels “as if [...] there 
were revelation in progress all around her” (28). Sometimes the revelation seems 
to be lurking under the thick layer of meaningless informational noise; some­
times it is the intriguing layout of Californian settlements that promises sal­
vation. Driving into San Narciso, Inverarity’s headquarters, Oedipa recalls the 
moment when, having opened a transistor radio, she saw a printed circuit for 
the first time:
The ordered swirl of houses and streets, from this high angle, sprang at her 
now with the same unexpected, astonishing clarity as the circuit card had. 
Though she knew even less about radios than about Southern Californians, 
there were to both outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of concealed 
meaning, of an intent to communicate. There’d seemed no limit to what the 
printed circuit could have told her /if she had tried to find out/; so in her 
first minute of San Narciso, a revelation also trembled just past the thresh­
old of her understanding. (13)
Although San Narciso, “like many named places in California,” is “less an 
identifiable city than a grouping of concepts” (12), the pattern of its buildings 
and streets seems, nevertheless, to contain an important message. In her un­
certainty vis-à-vis its puzzling “swirl,” the causal relation between the demise 
of the Cartesian Guarantor of True Knowledge and the feeling of being always 
apart from reality is particularly evident. As the divine order, “the deep struc­
ture” formerly present in the human mind and shaping all its products, no longer 
obtains, the words (if any) “spoken” by San Narciso cannot reach her. In the 
implied contrast to the inhabitants of the older, especially European cities which, 
always built around centre, reflected the confidence of people living in a God­
centered, comfortably totalized comprehensible reality,2 Oedipa is left entirely 
to herself.
In Lot 49, the problem of language, of the true relationship between words 
and things, constitutes an important aspect of the human predicament; Oedipa 
strains her ears in order to hear mysterious, transcendent words spoken on some 
other frequency; for Driblette, words are but “rote noises,” not so much a means 
of communication as a trigger for sollipsistic fantasies. Words are often use­
less and misleading, empty of meaning (Oedipa speaking the name of God), 
or pointing to a reality which cannot be contained within a name (“many named 
places in California”). Language and reality seem to exist hopelessly apart, the 
2 Cf. Johan Huizinga, Jesień średniowiecza, trans. Tadeusz Brzostowski (Warszawa: 
Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1974), p. 30.
68 Piotr Dziedzic
latter ignoring the former despite human efforts to bring them together. Com­
ing in between man and the world, words contribute to man’s encapsulation 
insofar as the human mind operates through language. This repeated emphasis 
on the role of language in the process of “projection of worlds” indicates the 
marked influence of Wittgenstein’s ideas on the concept of man’s confinement 
as put forward in Lot 49. For to see things through language, claims Wittgen­
stein, means to remain within unbreachable bounds; it means to exist inside 
a closed system, whose boundaries coincide with the boundaries of the formal­
ized system of communication that one has adopted: “The world is my world; 
this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which 
alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. The world and life are one. 
I am my world. (The microcosm).”3
In this system there is no place for metaphysics: “All Wittgenstein’s doctrines 
are related to his idea that language has limits imposed by its internal structure 
[...] and he places religion and morality beyond the limits because they do not 
meet the requirements of what can be said.”4 This is exactly what Oedipa can­
not and will not accept. Aware of the powerlessness of language in the situations 
which demand bursting its limits (“With coincidences blossoming these days 
wherever she looked, she had nothing but a sound, a word, Tristero, to hold them 
together” (80)), she wants to express her intimations not by means of ordinary 
words, but through the power of the lost, although - (she hopes) recoverable 
“direct, epileptic Word, the cry that might abolish the night” (87).
In her hope, Oedipa exhibits a poetic sensibility. What she shares with poets 
is the characteristic belief which David Daiches attributed to all versifiers of 
genius: the conviction that language is “not only expressive but cognitive and 
exploratory” and that “the nature of reality could be probed by the very fact 
of rendering it in poetic speech.”5 Poetic, visionary, or simply mad; Pynchon 
(apparently recording Oedipa’s thoughts) makes his own list of those who speak 
in order to express the unspeakable:
The saint whose water can light lamps, the clairvoyant whose lapse in recall 
is the breath of God, the true paranoid for whom all is organized in spheres 
joyful or threatning about the central pulse of himself, the dreamer whose 
puns probe the ancient fetid shafts and tunnels of truth all act in the same 
special relevance to the word, or whatever it is the word is there, buffering, 
to protect us from. (95)
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. Me 
Quinness. Quoted in William M. Plater, The Grim Phoenix: Reconstructing Thomas Pynchon 
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1970), p. 6.
4 David Pears, Wittgenstein (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 12.
5 David Daiches, A Critical History of English Literature, 2nd ed., Vol. 2 (London: Seeker 
and Warburg, 1971), p. 307.
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“The act of metaphor,” Oedipa realizes, may be but “a thrust at truth and lie,” 
a strenuous effort to transcend, “a trembling unfurrowing of the mind’s plow­
share” (95). But though in her quest for the Word she is to remain “unfurrowed,” 
sometimes a peculiar phrase, the double meaning of an expression can facil­
itate a peek through the veil. Thus holding an old sailor who suffers from 
delirium tremens, Oedipa is suddenly made aware of the uncanny potential lying 
in the fact that the abbreviation DT’s is liable to more readings than one: “She 
knew that the sailor had seen worlds no other man had seen if only because 
there was that high magic to low puns, because DT’s must give access to dt’s 
of spectra beyond the known sun, music made purely of Antarctic loneliness 
and fright.” (96)
For Oedipa, however, this is not enough. The direct Word she is after, the 
cry which she is unable to utter, hold out the hope of doing away with all forms 
of mediation, once and for all. The tower in which she is imprisoned can also 
be described as The Tower of Babel, the many languages spoken by humanity 
being but poor substitutes for the one sacred language capable of piercing into 
the heart of being. On such religious longings, “the yearning after a lost lin­
guistic paradise,” Leszek Kołakowski offers the following comment:
We find in many civilizations evidence of a nostalgic belief in an intrinsic, 
essential kinship between word and meaning and of an unending quest for 
the “true” meaning and the “true” language spoken at the beginning of time. 
Linguistically this is nonsense, to be sure: the meaning of words is deter­
mined by convention and historical accidents and, apart from actual usage, 
there is no “genuine” tongue, no veritable meaning and no mysterious af­
finity between things and names. Yet the myth of Babel is deeply rooted in 
our linguistic consciousness; we want to recover the lost, original, God-given 
speech in which things are called by their names, their celestial proper names. 
This belief and this quest manifest themselves and can be traced in magic, 
in rituals, in Cabbalistic explorations, in the entire esoteric tradition, in the 
very concept of the holy language.6
Oedipa’s hopes for finding that one revealing Word which would free her 
from confinement do not seem to have much to do with the Word in its tra­
ditional Christian sense: she is not interested in the message contained in the 
Gospel and incarnate in Jesus Christ. Instead, her hopes point to an intuitive 
grasping of some Fundamental Truth concerning the nature of reality. That 
Oedipa’s expectations are not oriented towards the integrating vision of the sort 
which Christianity used to provide is further suggested by Pynchon’s recourse 
to overtly Eliadean phraseology, such as for example: “Some immediacy was 
6 Leszek Kołakowski, Religion: If there is no God... (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1982), 
p. 183-184.
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there again, some promise of hierophany” (18). The character of her antici­
patory desire signifies a tendency toward the mystical and the archaic, the lost 
capacity for what Rudolf Otto called the “numinous” experience,7 the hope for 
the rediscovery of the Sacred in the wasteland of the Profane. The Word of 
the Puritans, like that of the literary critics (117), is not her game; rather than 
impose totalizing patterns on reality she would become reality. The attainment 
of this goal seems within reach: if she could only be incited by someone or 
something possessed of the Information she needs, if she could only find “the 
trigger for the unnameable act, the recognition, the Word” (136), Oedipa would 
“get through” at last.
Throughout the story, the Tristero seems to be fulfilling the function of such 
a trigger, a fearful depository of negentropic surprise. It penetrates easily through 
the walls of the Tower of Babel: its milieu consists of the “nameless” of the 
American society (136) and the language it speaks is that of silence. The 
blackness of the clothes worn by its emissaries melts with the blackness of “their 
exile: the night” (120), and the black deeds they commit accumulate into “dark 
history” which remains “unseen” (122). In the Tristero the medium (silence 
plus indistinctiveness of contour) appears to constitute at least part of the 
message, a wordless communication from “the separate, silent, unsuspected 
world” (92), whose very existence requires that it remains beyond language 
and out of sight. In Lot 49, whiteness and light tend to connote aridity of the 
modem world (not unlike in V.: Weissmann, but also Antarctic Vheissu with 
the terrifying absence of colour under its skin), and “the fluorescent bulbs 
[which] seemed to shriek whiteness” (90) stand in contrast to the silent dark­
ness of “ancient fetid shafts and tunnels of truth.” If the Tristero has in fact 
been set up by Inverarity in order to let Oedipa attain a higher state of con­
sciousness, then a revaluation of blackness - together with the heightened 
awareness of death - may have been among his objectives.
One can advance such speculation even further: is the blackness of the 
Tristero a sign pointing to the richness of vision directly opposite to what 
Heidegger calls “the metaphysics of light” - a mistaken concept, based on the 
assumption of the transparency (or manifestness) of truth understood as con­
tinuous presence, and of the separate existence of the human consciousness 
vis-a-vis that ultimately disclosable presence?8 For it is in the philosophy of 
Heidegger that the Cartesian dichotomy, still present in the ontology of Sartre, 
is finally invalidated, and the concept of human Dasein, the primary openness 
making the mind/world dichotomy possible, is put forward as the true mode 
7 Ninian Smart, The Religious Experience of Mankind (London: Fount Paperbacks, 1983), 
p. 49.
8 Cf. Krzysztof Michalski, Heidegger i filozofia współczesna (Warszawa: Państwowy 
Instytut Wydawniczy, 1978), p. 205.
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of man’s being in the world.9 Does the Tristero point the way to the recog­
nition of man’s true ontological status, something beyond the conceptual frame­
work of the West and therefore “unnamable”? Is the awaited Word, possibly 
“a real alternative to the exitlessness, to the absence of surprise to life” (128), 
to be understood as the Heraclitean Logos which “speaks the most surprising 
message” and “says that all beings are one, all beings happen together in 
Being”?10
For the reader to answer these questions in the affirmative would be tan­
tamount to deciphering the Tristero’s message, and thus attaining what Oedipa 
cannot attain. But the Tristero, in spite of the fact that some of its character­
istics provoke such Heideggerian interpretation, eludes all attempts to reduce 
it to a coherent pattern. What, for example, is one to make of the repeated 
references to its cruelty and malevolence? The Tristero may, after all, be an 
evil force, threatening an even worse form of imprisonment, and thus confirming 
Oedipa’s suspicions about the supernatural provenance of her encapsulation. 
In Lot 49 blackness can also denote exitlessness: the Word Oedipa keeps looking 
for is to abolish the night. And while suggestions to this effect may sound 
somewhat perfunctory (in the entropic world populated by prisoners for life, 
the mysterious organization offers at least a chance for change), this aspect of 
the Tristero cannot be ignored.
Not only is the character of the Tristero open to various contradictory 
interpretations. Underlying all ambiguities is always the key question of its 
existence: dream or reality, transcendence or nothingness? But, perhaps, 
a question formulated in this way cannot be answered. Near the end of her quest 
Oedipa gives vent to her frustration over the necessity of always having to select 
one of the two mutually exclusive possibilities. Faced with the entropic non­
choice of an either/or situation, Oedipa would rather not choose at all:
She had heard all about excluded middles, they were bad shit, to be avoided; 
and how had it ever happened here, with the chances once so good for 
diversity? For it was now like walking among matrices of a great digital 
computer, the zeroes and ones twinned above, hanging like balanced mobiles 
right and left, ahead, thick, maybe endless. Behind the hieroglyphic streets 
there would either be a transcendent meaning, or only the earth. (136)
When we see her for the last time, Oedipa is anxiously awaiting an auction 
to begin. It is an event which might result in the final disclosure of the Tris­
tero’s true identity meaning and intent. With her quest approaching its end, 
Oedipa, deserted by everybody, feels even more isolated than before. Nothing 
has been solved - no exit from the tower of her mind has been found.
9 Cf. Michalski, pp. 120-126.
10 James L. Perotti, Heidegger on the Divine (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1974), p. 78.
